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HE IS a pesky, devious autocrat, as incompetent at administration as he is at negotiation, an acknowledged problem even for his colleagues. But, awkward as he is, Yasser Arafat is the Palestinians' elected president, the symbol of the identity that they have preserved through years of tribulation. Moreover, no evidence has been produced, though there is bad-mouthing in plenty, to connect him with the terrorist bombs that have killed so many Israeli civilians. Yet the Israeli government decided on September 11th that he should be “removed”, possibly, as Israel's deputy prime minister, Ehud Olmert, later expounded, by assassination. Politically, this decision was unwise; morally and legally it is indefensible.

Mr Olmert, ruminating on killing Mr Arafat, was playing to a narrow domestic gallery. In its demonising of the Palestinian leader, the government has Israeli public opinion full-throatedly behind it. Ever since the collapse of talks at Camp David three years ago, and the start of the Palestinians' armed intifada, Mr Arafat has been depicted by Israelis, government and people, as the source of all evil. Mr Olmert's colleagues, realising that talk of killing was hardly tactful, have played his statement down. But, in fact, Mr Olmert may have been calling a spade a spade: expulsion and killing could be synonymous. When Mr Arafat declares that he will never again be driven into exile, but will greet soldiers who come to arrest him pistol in hand, most Palestinians believe he is telling the truth.

Regime-change has been much in the air since the September 11th terrorist attacks in America, but Israel has not made its case for removing Mr Arafat. Though he continues to struggle against the Israeli occupation, he has not, for a long time, been a “terrorist” in internationally accepted uses of the term. Even if he were, it would almost certainly be unwise to expel or kill him, turning him into a political martyr. As it is, it is unacceptable, by any standard, for a government to announce that it intends to remove the elected head of a nation-to-be that it is supposed to be negotiating with over independence.

Does the Israeli government care? Not on any general principles. It is not, as yet, implementing its decision because the United States has told it not to. Although George Bush's administration refuses to have any dealings with Mr Arafat, and would clearly like to see the back of him, it is aware of the political consequences if Israel goes beyond isolating the Palestinian in his Ramallah headquarters, and proceeds somehow to remove him. Its public reaction to the Israeli cabinet decision was muted: Colin Powell, the secretary of state, and Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, described it as not helpful; after Mr Olmert's clarification, Mr Powell, from Baghdad, spoke of the danger of Arab outrage. But, in private, Mr Bush has issued clear instructions to Ariel Sharon to leave the Palestinian president alone (see article).

The question is what happens after the next big terrorist outrage. Even with America's current prohibition, the situation remains dangerous. Mr Sharon's office had been letting it be known that it had detected some weakening of America's opposition. This could have been misinformation, preparing the way for action, in which Mr Sharon would claim, not for the first time, that Israel had been given at least an amber light to proceed. And, indeed, this sequence could still happen, leading to unpredictable mayhem in the occupied territories, and possibly ending the era of Palestinian self-rule.

Mr Sharon likes to look wise, these days, restraining his colleagues. But in the past, the old warrior has acted on bad impulse. Though he has agreed to a Palestinian “state”, he remains profoundly opposed to the state based on pre-1967 frontiers that Mr Arafat stands for. Thus, for reasons that have little to do with terrorism, he is determined never to get into negotiations with the Palestinian. This is a core difference between the two: Mr Arafat blew his chances at the Camp David talks, but Mr Sharon would have avoided starting them.

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